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THE HIV LITIGATION AND ITS SETTLEMENT
[IN JAPAN]1
Awaji Takehisa 2
Translation by Keisuke Mark Abe
3
Abstract: As early as 1983, Japan's Health and Welfare Ministry had reason to
know that the use of unheated blood products by hemophiliacs was infecting them with
HIV, the AIDS virus. Although heated-and safe-blood products were already
available from the United States, government approval in Japan was deliberately delayed
for almost three years while local pharmaceutical companies developed the products. By
the time the unheated blood products were all withdrawn from the market, many of
'Japan's hemophiliacs had contracted HIV. A number of them, or their survivors, sued
the government and the pharmaceutical companies. At the end of the consolidated trials,
but before handing down their opinions, the two District Courts handling the cases made
proposals for settlement that were accepted by the parties. The courts' reasons for
recommending settlement were that time was of the essence in order to get relief to those
still suffering and that remedies unavailable via the courts were possible through
settlement.
1. INTRODUCTION
(1) As is widely known, a truly tragic incident occurred in Japan
when unheated concentrated blood products containing the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV)4 were imported from the United States and
administered by transfusion to hemophiliacs.' This was termed the HIV-, or
Translated from Awaji Takehisa, HIVsosh6 to wakai, 1093 JURISUTO 52 (1996). Notes, unless
otherwise indicated, are parenthetical or other information contained in the original text. Cites in the
original converted to Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal style where possible.
2 Professor of Law, St. Paul's University. The author wishes to thank Suzuki Toshihiro and other
members of counsel for the plaintiffs in the Tokyo HIV litigation for providing him with the materials
including their trial briefs. [Postscript in the original article.]
3 Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Law and Politics, LL.B., LL.M. (University of Tokyo);
LL.M. (Harvard). The translator is not related in any way to Abe Takeshi, former head of the Health and
Welfare Ministry's AIDS research team. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
It is also known as the AIDS virus.
This is the so-called third route of HIV transmission. In addition, it has turned out that there is a
fourth route, that is, where contaminated blood products are administered to patients other than
hemophiliacs, such as those with liver disease. [Translator's note: According to the Japanese media's
terminology, the first two routes of HIV transmission are through sexual contact and prenatal infection.
See, e.g., Yamamuro Hiroyuki, Officials Must Account for Their Actions, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 30, 1996,
at 6.]
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AIDS-contaminated blood products incident. Of Japan's approximately
5,000 hemophiliacs, about forty percent or between 1,800 and 2,000 people
are said to be infected with HIV. One-third of them have already
experienced AIDS symptoms. Of these, two-thirds are already dead. The
HIV-, or AIDS-contaminated blood products litigation, began when some of
these victims filed suit against the five pharmaceutical firms that had
produced and sold the [contaminated] blood products,6 and against the
Japanese government, which is responsible for regulating pharmaceuticals.7
From the companies, the plaintiffs sought compensation in contract for
breach of the duty to give careful consideration to the safety of their
products, and in tort under the Civil Code. From the government, the
plaintiffs sought to recover damages on the basis of negligence. 9
The HIV litigation started in 1989. The first lawsuit was filed in May
of that year, at Civil Section No. 18, Osaka District Court. The first lawsuit
in Tokyo was filed in October at Civil Section No. 15, Tokyo District Court.
This came about through the devoted efforts of attorneys and supporters
who helped the hemophiliacs with HIV at a time when it was extremely
difficult to do so because of prejudice and discrimination against people
with AIDS. Subsequently, as the facts were brought to light in court and the
legal issues were clarified, the plaintiffs gradually gained the support of
public opinion, partly due to reports in the news media.'0 Under these
circumstances, the consolidated trial in Tokyo" ended in March 1995, and
the consolidated trial in Osaka, 2 in July. On October 6, 1995, while the
6 They are Green Cross Corp., Baxter International Inc., Nippon Z6ki Pharmaceutical Co., Bayer
Pharmaceutical Ltd., and Chemo-Sero-Therapeutic Research Institute.
The ministry in charge of this matter is the Health and Welfare Ministry.
MNPO § 709.
9 Kokka baishfh6 [National Compensation Act], Law No. 125 of 1947, § 1(1). In addition to this
civil litigation, criminal complaints have been filed with prosecutors against the medical personnel,
executives of pharmaceutical firms, and bureaucrats who were involved in this matter. It is possible that
the HIV criminal litigation will soon start. [Translator's note: Between September and October 1996,
prosecutors indicted Abe Takeshi, infra note 25, three former presidents of Green Cross Corp., and
Matsumura Akihito, former director of the Biologics and Antibiotics Division (seibutsu seizai kach6) of the
Health and Welfare Ministry, for professional negligence resulting in death, a criminal offense punishable
by up to five years in jail. See 3 Former Presidents of Green Cross Indicted, DAILY YOM1URI, Oct. 10,
1996, at 2; DAILY YOMIURI, supra note 5, at 6. Prosecutors claim that Matsumura failed to instruct doctors
to stop using unheated blood products while he was director from July 1984 to June 1986, although he was
aware of their potential to transmit HIV. See Matsumura Indictment Expected in Unheated Blood Product
Scandal, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 24, 1996, at 2. Prosecutors decided not to seek criminal charges against
Gunji Atsuaki, infra note 24, Matsumura's predecessor at the Division. Id]
The NHK [national public television] report was particularly outstanding.
Four suits had been filed at the Tokyo District Court.
12 Ten suits had been filed at the Osaka District Court.
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parties were awaiting decision, each court made an initial proposal for out-
of-court settlement and issued a "Statement of Opinion on the
Recommended Settlement." On March 7, 1996, the courts presented their
second proposals, suggesting ways to resolve matters not mentioned in the
first proposals. On March 29, 1996, the parties accepted the courts'
proposals.
(2) Part II of this article outlines the development of the HIV
litigation in Japan. Part III introduces the contents of the court proposals
and Statements of Opinion and analyzes their legal significance. Part IV
concludes the article with an examination of the contents of the final
settlement and an assessment of this settlement as a whole.
There have been several valuable documents written by journalists
regarding the course of the HIV litigation. 3 At the present stage, however,
since the facts ("the truth") are still under investigation, led by the Diet and
by the media, and since the courts did not make the findings of fact that
would accompany a court opinion, 4 there are a number of points that it is
difficult to describe clearly. I hope that the determination of the facts will
be advanced hereafter by the efforts of the persons concerned. In this
article, I will state the facts only to the extent necessary to legal
evaluation.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE [HIV] INCIDENT
(1) I will begin by reviewing how this all happened. Then, I will
describe how the danger from the unheated blood products was discovered,
with special emphasis on the situation in the United States at that time, and
give a sketch of the measures taken-and not taken-in Japan under the
" See YOMIURI SHIMBUN, May 19, 1996, at 12 (containing a bibliography on these AIDS cases). See
also SAKURAI YOSHIKO, AIDS HANZAI: KETSUYOBYO KANJA No HIGEKI [THE AIDS CRIME: THE
TRAGEDY OF HEMOPHILIACS] (1994) and HIROKAWA RYMICHI, YAKUGAI AIDS No SHINSO [THE TRUTH
OF THE AIDS-CONTAMINATED BLOOD PRODUCTS INCIDENT] (1996) (both books particularly important for
learning the facts of the AIDS-contaminated blood products incident). [Note I in the original article.]
This was because the lawsuits ended in settlement.
' In addition to SAKURAI, supra note [13], and HIROKAWA, supra note [13], 1 also rely on Sugiyama
Shinichi, HIVsoshi: wakai to sono go no tenb6, 498 HOGAKU SEMINAR 4 (1996), the plaintiffs' trial briefs,
the defendant government's trial briefs, the defendant pharmaceutical firms' trial briefs, and articles that
appeared in ASAH SHIMBUN, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, and MAINICHI SHIMBUN. For the sake of simplicity, I
will generally not cite statements concerning facts generally accepted in light of several written materials
and press reports. I will, however, quote parts that I think particularly essential to the discussion. [Note 2
in the original article.]
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circumstances. This should furnish the factual basis for making a judgment
concerning whether the defendant pharmaceutical firms and the government
were negligent or not.
(2) Hemophilia is a disease characterized by a congenital lack of a
coagulation factor 16 in blood plasma and a consequent difficulty in stopping
bleeding. The disease is carried by sex-linked inheritance, and its
symptoms appear in males. In the past, the only treatment 17 for hemophilia
was to transfuse whole blood, just as it was taken from donors, or to
transfuse blood plasma. But following the authorization in 1967 of Blood
Product I, created by the Cohn [ethanol] fractionation technique,
cryoprecipitate ("cryo"), which is made by extracting Factor VIII from
plasma in fresh blood, 8 was approved in 1970 under the Pharmaceutical
Affairs Act'9 for purposes of treating type A hemophiliacs, and was put in
use.20 Ordinarily, cryo is made from one or two donors' blood.
Subsequently, pharmaceutical firms started producing blood products
that densely concentrated these blood-clotting factors.2' They were
approved by the Japanese government in 1972 as to Factor IX and in 1978
as to Factor VIII. Because concentrated blood products were relatively easy
to use, and because the pharmaceutical companies actively promoted their
sale, it became common for hemophiliacs to self-inject them at home.
Further, in February 1983, the government allowed coverage under the
national health insurance of such home treatment. As a result, concentrated
blood products came to be used in large quantities.
However, these blood products were made from blood collected from
paid [donors] in the United States. In the manufacturing process, an
immense quantity of blood plasma, from as many as 2,000 to 25,000
22donors, was pooled in one container. Because there were individuals
infected with HIV among these numerous donors, the entire pool of plasma
would become contaminated with HIV. And because these contaminated
blood products were imported from the United States and used by many
6 Type A hemophiliacs lack a substance known as Factor VIII, whereas type B hemophiliacs lack
Factor IX.
'7 At present, it is impossible to cure hemophilia.
Cryo is made by freezing or freeze-drying the precipitate produced when blood plasma is frozen,
then slowly melted down.
Yakujih6 [Pharmaceutical Affairs Act], Law No. 145 of 1960.
20 Cryo does not contain Factor IX.
21 These products were not heat treated.
22 Among them were a number of drug addicts and homosexual men.
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hemophiliacs, it led to the disaster of as many as forty percent of Japanese
hemophiliacs' contracting HIV.
(3) Between June and August of 1981, the American Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) reported that Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and
Kaposi's sarcoma, both of which had been extremely rare in the United
States, were prevalent among homosexual men, and issued an
epidemiological opinion suggesting that immune deficiency related to some
unknown factor common to these patients might be the common underlying
medical condition for these diseases. In July 1982, the CDC reported in the
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) that three hemophiliacs,
who had been using unheated concentrated blood products, developed
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, and that two of them suffered from
cellular immune deficiency. The report explained that, although the cause
of this immune deficiency was not clear, the circumstances suggested that
they had become infected through the use of blood products. This was the
first time that AIDS cases were reported. In December of that year, the
MMWR reported four more cases and one suspected case of AIDS in
hemophiliacs, with the comment that the number of such cases was
increasing and that AIDS might put hemophiliacs in serious peril.
In March 1983, the CDC warned in the MMWR that it appeared that
hemophiliacs were contracting AIDS from blood or blood products, and
made several recommendations along with other agencies. Among them
were recommendations to avoid blood donations from members of high-risk
groups, and to conduct research to develop safer products for hemophiliacs.
In the same month, Travenol Ltd.,23 which had developed a heat treatment
method to cope with the threat of hepatitis transmission, was licensed to
start manufacturing heated blood products. In May of that year, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) recommended this to other pharmaceutical
firms, based on the determination that it would similarly prevent HIV
transmission. In June [1983], Travenol informed the director of the
Biologics and Antibiotics Division ["B.A.D."] of Japan's Health and
Welfare Ministry 24 that it had voluntarily recalled certain of its products
from the American market, because one of its donors had shown symptoms
indicating AIDS shortly after donating blood used for plasma. At that time,
' Now Baxter International Inc.
24 The report from Travenol went to Gunji Atsuaki, then director of the Biologics and Antibiotics
Division. The Division was in charge of matters related to blood and blood products at that time.
JULY 1997
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
other products made from this same blood plasma [pool] had already been
imported into Japan. Because they had not yet been supplied to the market,
steps were taken to ban shipment.
(4) In Japan, immediately after the director of B.A.D. received the
Travenol report that it had recalled blood products, an AIDS research team
was organized within the Health and Welfare Ministry.25 It is said that the
B.A.D. director did not inform the research team that Travenol had pulled
[certain of] its blood products off the market.
In July 1983, after a hemophiliac developed AIDS symptoms and
died at the Teiky6 University Hospital,2 6 there was a discussion at the
research team's second meeting on whether they should recognize this as a
case of AIDS, but they decided not to do so after all.27 Subsequently, in
May 1985, two months after the first Japanese case of AIDS was officially
announced,28 the research team officially recognized that the hemophiliac
[in the 1983 case] had died of AIDS. While the circumstances surrounding
the diagnosis of the first officially-recognized AIDS patient are currently in
controversy, 29 people wonder why the research team only belatedly
acknowledged the hemophiliac at the Teiky6 University Hospital as an
AIDS patient, and suspect that they tried to conceal the existence of AIDS.
Criticism behind this suspicion is that, if they had recognized the
hemophiliac as the first AIDS patient in July 1983, Japan would have
started taking countermeasures to cope with AIDS from that point, and
heated blood products for hemophiliacs would have been considered in a
totally different light. °
Is it not true that the B.A.D. director proposed at the AIDS research
team's meeting in July 1983 that heated blood products be imported on an
emergency basis from the United States? Why did he suddenly change his
position in a week? As to these points, huge doubts remain. In an internal
document which was "discovered" at the Health and Welfare Ministry in
January 1996, there are written descriptions of the B.A.D. director's
perception of the danger of, and his ideas of how to cope with, HIV
25 The head of this research team was Abe Takeshi, former vice president of Teiky6 University.
26 [Team leader] Abe was the doctor in charge.
2 Shortly thereafter, an American AIDS specialist came to Japan and determined that this patient
had died of AIDS. Nevertheless, the research team did not rectify its conclusion at that time.
" The patient was a homosexual man living in the United States who had returned to Japan for a
short visit.
It is doubted that he had yet developed AIDS symptoms. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, May 26, 1996.
o As a consequence, HIV transmission to hemophiliacs could likely have been minimized.
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transmission through unheated blood products as of July 1983. According
to a document dated July 4, 1983, measures to be taken were as follows:
(i) The ministry will order the AIDS research team to recommend the
use of heated blood products.
(ii) The ministry will direct Travenol Ltd., an American corporation,
to file an application at once for urgent approval of its heated blood
products in Japan.
(iii) The ministry will direct businesses by means of administrative
guidance not to handle unheated blood products made from blood collected
in the United States.
He reached a different conclusion in a document of July 11, however,
stating that emergency imports of heated blood products through extralegal
measures were undesirable, and that the ministry would not put a total ban
on unheated blood products from the United States. People suspect that
something must have happened during this [one-week] period. In the AIDS
Survey Report released by a Health and Welfare Ministry survey team on
March 19, 1996, this director, in response to interrogation, answered that, in
his recollection, he had never considered emergency imports [of heated
blood products], that the document [of July 4, 1983,] was a discussion draft
created only to form a basis for the investigation, but that it did reflect the
Biologics and Antibiotics Division's atmosphere at the time quite well.
Opinions of the members of the research team at the time are divided on the
issue of whether there was a proposal for emergency imports.3 While the
facts are somewhat ambiguous, it can be inferred that the Biologics and
Antibiotics Division already knew, with considerable certainty, the risk of
I-IV transmission from that period. As for imports of heated blood products
at an early stage, it is reported that, although an official at B.A.D. again
made such a proposal at the research team's fourth meeting in October
1983, Abe Takeshi, the head of the research team, furiously objected.32
At the research team's third meeting in August 1983, there was a
discussion of switching [from unheated blood products] to cryo, and
3' ASAHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 20, 1996.
3 YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Feb. 26, 1996.
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conflicting opinions were expressed.33 In order to examine this issue, a
subcommittee on blood products was set up under the research team.34
Switching to cryo, like emergency imports of heated blood products, would
have been a way to prevent HIV transmission to hemophiliacs. The
subcommittee, however, at its first meeting in September 1983, decided not
to switch to cryo and submitted a report to that effect in March 1984. The
AIDS research team authorized the continued use of unheated blood
products until clinical tests on heated blood products were fully performed.
It is suspected that Abe was influential in leading the research team to such
a conclusion, and that he considered the interests of a domestic
pharmaceutical firm with which he had a connection. Thereafter, the use of
unheated blood products mushroomed, partly because home use had been
brought within the coverage of national health insurance and partly because
the companies vigorously sought to increase sales by discounting the price.
In September 1984, it was discovered that twenty-three of Abe's
patients were HIV-positive. Abe had sent blood samples of forty-eight of
his patients to the United States for HIV testing. This fact was not made
public, however, and the number of hemophiliacs with HIV quietly grew
with the use of unheated blood products.
(5) As mentioned above, in March 1985, a homosexual man was
officially recognized as the first AIDS patient in Japan, and the case of the
hemophiliac who had died at the Teiky6 University Hospital was
subsequently recognized in May of that year. Prior to this, clinical tests of
heated blood products had been conducted since February 1984.35 By May
1985, the domestic firms36 had developed the heat treatment technology, 37
so applications for approval of heated blood products were filed,38 and the
approvals were given for Factor VIII in July of that year. The government
licensed the products of the foreign and domestic firms at exactly the same
time. This was two years and four months later than the United States'
action in this matter. In December 1985, heated blood products for Factor
IX were also licensed.
s' It is reported that Abe vehemently opposed this proposal. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Feb. 26, 1996.
3' Kazama Mutsumi, then Associate Professor, Teiky6 University, a former student of Abe, headed
the unit. Of eleven members of this subcommittee, eight were hemophilia specialists. There was no, or at
least there were very few, specialists in hematology or virology. See SAKURAI, supra note [13], at 40.
3' Abe performed the tests as supervising doctor for the five pharmaceutical firms involved.
36 Green Cross was the largest.
5' It is said that the domestic firms were later in developing this technology than the foreign firms.
s Foreign firms filed their applications in April 1985; Green Cross, at the end of May.
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Pharmaceutical firms, however, did not recall [already distributed]
unheated blood products promptly. Nor did the Health and Welfare
Ministry direct them to do so. Consequently, even after heated blood
products were introduced to the market, unheated blood products already
shipped were put to use and new shipments of unheated blood products
were made.3 9 With this, the disaster spread.
(6) As stated above, following these events, the HIV litigation was
commenced in 1989, the trials ended in 1995, and the courts presented their
proposals for settlement in October 1995 and in March 1996. I will now
turn to the contents of the court proposals and examine their legal
significance.
III. THE [COURTS'] RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR
SETTLEMENT, AND THE LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATIONS AND THE
GOVERNMENT
A. The Courts'First Proposals for Settlement, "Statements of Opinion,"
And Their Legal Significance
(1) On October 6, 1995, the Tokyo and Osaka District Courts each
presented to the parties proposals for out-of-court settlement and
"Statements of Opinion on the Recommended Settlements" ("Statements of
Opinion"). The proposals were identical, and the contents of the
"Statements of Opinion," too, were about the same in principle.4 °
In summary, the proposals were as follows:
(a) (i) The defendants shall jointly and severally pay V-45,000,000
[approximately $360,000] per person as a lump sum settlement to
compensate for the injuries of those infected with HIV4 to all claimants
alike, including the plaintiffs in this case.
(ii) The defendant pharmaceutical firms shall pay sixty percent of the
3 It is reported that it took Green Cross two years and nine months after the approval of heated
blood products in July 1985 to finish recalling all its unheated blood products. ASAHt SHIMBUN, Mar. I,
1996, (Evening ed.).
The statements of opinion differ in their level of detail.
41 Those who have already developed AIDS and those who have died of AIDS are included.
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settlement amount, and the government shall pay forty percent.
(iii) Of the amounts that the plaintiffs have received prior to this
settlement from the [Friendship and Welfare] Foundation, fifty
percent of the total of the special allowances, the bereavement gifts,
and the bereavement lump sums, shall be subtracted from the
amounts they are to receive under this settlement.
(iv) This settlement applies to those who have filed suit, but those
who have yet to prove that they became infected With HIV through
the use of unheated blood products shall be subject to this settlement
upon producing such proof.
(v) The parties shall continue negotiations with respect to the
treatment [of the victims] who have not yet filed suit.
(vi) The parties shall also continue negotiations with respect to the
defrayal of litigation costs, including attorneys' fees and so forth.
(b) The parties shall also continue negotiations with respect to the so-
called permanent measures expected to complement the lump sum
settlement stated in (a) (i).
(2) Next, I will look into the "Statement of Opinion" issued by the
Tokyo District Court with its proposal for settlement. In brief, its contents
were as follows:
(a) To begin with, the court stated that, in light of the extraordinary
nature of these cases, it was highly desirable that, for the benefit of both
parties and particularly for purposes of providing immediate relief to the
IV-infected plaintiffs, the parties resolve their dispute through settlement,
in a speedy and comprehensive manner.
(b) Then, the court pointed out four distinctive characteristics of these
cases:
(i) The plaintiffs became infected with HV through the
continuous use of unheated concentrated blood products,
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"pursuant to their doctors' advice and sincerely believing the
products to be an effective medical treatment." Yet the
majority of the plaintiffs had the misfortune to develop serious
AIDS symptoms; further, due to the delay in notification of
IV infection, secondary infection took place as well.
(ii) Individuals with AIDS develop opportunistic infections,
malignant tumors, and so forth, and ultimately die. Also, the
reality is that they are subject to discrimination from society.
(iii) The number of Japanese hemophiliacs infected with HIV
through concentrated blood products is said to be about 1,800
to 2,000. Over the past ten or so years following the first
confirmed case of AIDS, the number of those suffering from
AIDS has increased every year.
(iv) "This court believes that it is totally inexcusable from a
social as well as a humanitarian perspective that the plaintiffs,
born hemophiliacs through no fault of their own in the first
place, have had to experience this fatal and excruciating
disease, the agony of which can only be described as
heartbreaking, just because they, in accordance with their
physicians' advice, and sincerely believing the products to be
an effective treatment, used unheated concentrated blood
products accidentally contaminated with HIV."
(c) Furthermore, the court discussed the defendants' responsibility as
follows:
(i) Manufacturers and dealers in pharmaceutical products have
a duty to supply consumers with safe products. The
Pharmaceutical Affairs Act provides that one may not sell, or
manufacture or import with the intent to sell, pharmaceutical
products contaminated with, or possibly contaminated with,
pathogenic microorganisms.42
(ii) While the Health and Welfare Minister had an official duty
42 Yakujih6, § 56(6).
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to assure the safety of pharmaceutical products even under the
prior Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, this duty has been fortified
by new legislation. The amended Pharmaceutical Affairs Act
clearly states that one of its purposes is to "ensure the safety of
pharmaceutical products,"43 and that, when authorizing the
manufacture of a pharmaceutical product, the Health and
Welfare Ministry should review its "side effects."'44 Moreover,
in order to prevent harm to the public health due to [defective]
pharmaceutical products from occurring or spreading, the
procedure for emergency orders has been newly established.45
It follows that the safety of pharmaceutical products is now one
of the subjects that the Health and Welfare Minister should
give utmost consideration in monitoring pharmaceutical affairs.
Thus, the Health and Welfare Minister has a responsibility to
exercise his or her powers to the maximum to ensure the safety
of pharmaceutical products, taking steps to make sure that no
products become contaminated with pathogenic
microorganisms, and that no products contaminated with
pathogenic microorganisms are manufactured or sold in
Japan.46 [The Minister must] protect the lives and health of the
people from the side effects of pharmaceutical products and
from defective pharmaceutical products.
(iii) Because the blood products that the defendant firms were
manufacturing and selling were made by refining pooled blood
plasma containing a great number of people's blood, and
because the main raw material for the products was blood
purchased in the United States, it was pointed out [from the
beginning] that impurities such as viruses could be introduced
in the process. As a matter of fact, many of those who were
administered the defendant firms' products actually became
infected with hepatitis, apparently because of the hepatitis virus
in the products. On the other hand, it was made clear by the
[U.S.] Public Health Service (PHS) and the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) that, since around July 1982, a syndrome later
4 Yakujih6, § I [as amended by Law No. 56 of 1979].
Y Vakujih6, § 14(2).
41 Yakujih6, § 69-2.
4 Yakujih6, § 56(6).
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referred to as AIDS had appeared in type A hemophiliacs in the
United States. Thereafter, as the number of such cases
increased, it was determined that it was likely that a virus,
transmitted through blood or blood products, was causing the
disease; further, it was hypothesized that there were many
people infected with the virus who had not yet developed the
symptoms. Also, it was apparent that AIDS was a disease with
a high mortality rate. Since early in 1983, the United States
government issued numerous recommendations about
measures to protect hemophiliacs from AIDS, among which
was a suggestion to reject blood donors belonging to high-risk
groups.
[The court] finds that the director of the Biologics and
Antibiotics Division at the Health and Welfare Ministry knew
the foregoing situation in the United States, for he had started
collecting information on AIDS and hemophilia around the
beginning of 1983. In addition, [he knew] from Baxter's report
that, in June or July of that year, the company had voluntarily
recalled products containing blood plasma from a donor
suspected of suffering from AIDS. By then, the director had a
strong suspicion that the cause of AIDS was a virus transmitted
through blood or blood products. The AIDS research team at
the Health and Welfare Ministry, too, was discussing the matter
on the assumption that it was likely that AIDS was an
infectious disease caused by a virus. There is some evidence of
a proposal made by the director at the research team's second
meeting in July 1983 that [heated blood products] be
immediately imported. Moreover, around August of that year,
when the CDC specialist diagnosed the Teiky6 University
Hospital case as AIDS, it became clear that there had been a
hemophiliac suffering from AIDS in Japan. As a purely
scientific matter, the cause of AIDS had not been established at
that time and the AIDS virus had yet to be identified.
However, considering the results of the studies conducted by
the governmental agencies of the United States and the
professional opinions based on those results, the fact that AIDS
was brought on by a virus transmitted through blood or blood
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products was, at least with regard to AIDS in hemophiliacs,
becoming common knowledge among scientists.
(iv) The defendant pharmaceutical firms, "even under such
circumstances, continued to sell their unheated blood products
until they were licensed to manufacture and actually started the
sale of heated blood products. Even after they had begun to
sell heated blood products, they did not completely recall all
unheated products, so some hospitals administered the
unheated blood products [to patients] as before."
Under these circumstances, it must be said that the
Health and Welfare Minister "should have known that
hemophiliacs in Japan were exposed to the risk of contracting
AIDS due to a virus transmitted through blood products.
Furthermore, since it had been demonstrated that, once an
individual developed AIDS, the mortality rate was extremely
high, it was desirable that the Minister would take steps to
prevent HIV transmission to hemophiliacs in Japan, such as
giving ample information concerning the risk to the relevant
agencies, institutions, and to hemophiliacs themselves, taking
emergency measures to secure alternative blood products by
enhancing the domestic supply of concentrated blood products
or cryo made from blood donated in Japan, or by directing
imports of, or accelerating the approval of, heated blood
products, and, by exercising the power to issue emergency
orders, as mentioned above, suspending the sale of unheated
blood products made from blood plasma collected in the
United States." However, Health and Welfare officials "did
not take any of these meaningful measures, and it is difficult to
deny that this delay in taking action resulted in the spread of a
tragic injury, HIV transmission to hemophiliacs in Japan."
(v) Such being the case, [the court] believes that the defendant
pharmaceutical firms should be primarily responsible for
making reparation for losses described in (b), but that the
defendant government, together with the pharmaceutical firms,
should also be responsibile for urgently compensating plaintiffs
for the terrible injuries caused by [HIV] transmission.
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(d) Finally, the court emphasized the necessity by all means of
resolving the dispute as soon as possible through settlement, stating that it
was essential that those infected with HIV, including the plaintiffs, be
quickly and comprehensively compensated for their losses through a
settlement that uniformly and impartially remedied the situation of all these
HIV victims.
(3) How should we evaluate the courts' first proposals for settlement
and "Statements of Opinion" just described? The lawsuits actually
terminated in settlement without judgments, as the courts had suggested.
Accordingly, as an official matter, there are no judicial decrees
demonstrating how the courts determined the liability of the corporations
and the government. Even if this was the only way to work things out in
these particular cases,47 it is necessary in such serious cases that we clarify
the defendants' legal responsibility both for the benefit of the victims, who
suffered grave losses, and to make sure that such events will never be
repeated.
As a matter of fact, if we read between the lines, it seems reasonable
to suppose that the courts' determination of the defendants' liability was
made clear in the "Statements of Opinion" regarding the recommended
settlement.48
First, since passages conceming the defendants' responsibility in the
"Statements of Opinion" were structured in a way that is used by the courts
in officially determining legal responsibility, they could be easily converted
into a judicial decree if they were put into a proper format and elaborated.49
Secondly, although the pharmaceutical firms' legal responsibility was
discussed only in rather terse fashion in the "Statements of Opinion"
probably because it was so obvious [that they were liable for the plaintiffs'
losses], their legal duty, a prerequisite for holding them liable, was specified
in (c) (i);50 foreseeability, which is one of the elements of negligence, 5 was
41 In light of the existence of so many victims and the severe nature of the injuries, it seems fair to
say that resolving the dispute through out-of-court settlement was the only realistic solution.
41 See lizuka Tomoyuki & Ito Toshikatsu, H1Vsosh6: wakai kankoku wo dd miruka, [492] HOGAKU
SEMINAR 17 (1995). [Note 3 in the original article.]
Of course, it would be necessary that phrases like "has a responsibility to" (sekimu ga aru) be
replaced with [more formal language] like "has a duty to" (gimu ga aru).
'o The courts cite Yakujih6 § 56(6), but in any case, it goes without saying that there is a duty of
care for the safety of others under ordinary tort law. [MINPO § 709.]
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set forth in (c) (iii); and the failure of their duty to avoid the [injurious]
consequence was mentioned in the section concerning the pharmaceutical
firms in (c) (iv).
It has been shown frequently in prior court opinions that
pharmaceutical firms owe a heightened duty of care. Yet here, in my
opinion, such a theory would have been unnecessary, for it seems to me
that, with respect to the pharmaceutical firms in this case, intentional torts, 52
or at least gross negligence, could have been established. For example,
Green Cross's U.S. subsidiary 3 had been sending information on the risk of
unheated blood products to Green Cross since around the end of 1982. 54
Nevertheless, Green Cross kept on selling unheated blood products and did
not recall them until over two years after the approval of heated blood
products. It is entirely possible to call this gross negligence.
Thirdly, in regard to the government's responsibility, the "Statements
of Opinion" specifically set forth, in (c) (ii), the purpose of the amended
Pharmaceutical Affairs Act55 and the Health and Welfare Ministry's
regulatory powers which ought to have been applied in this case,56 and
explicated the contents of the government's legal duty. Then, in (c) (iii),
[the Statements] pointed out the facts evidencing foreseeability. In addition,
they listed, in the part of (c) (iv) concerning the government, the steps [the
government] should have taken to avoid the [injurious] consequence.
If we look back upon the development of the incident described here,
we may say that [the risk of harm] was foreseeable to the government early
in 1983, at the latest, and that thereafter measures to avoid the [injurious]
consequence should have been taken. Available measures ranged from the
moderate step of providing information on the risk57 to suspending the sale
" MINPO § 709, or alternatively, breach of the duty to give careful consideration to the safety [of a
product].
2 Under the theory that acquiescence [to the injurious consequence] is an element of an intentional
tort, an intentional tort is established when acquiescence [in addition to the fact that the actor knew the risk
of harm and nevertheless proceeded to act] is shown. Some scholars, on the other hand, argue that it is
sufficient that an actor knew the risk of harm and nevertheless proceeded to act, and that acquiescence is
not a requisite element. According to them, an intentional tort can be established even if the plaintiff fails
to prove the defendant's acquiescence.
' The Alpha Therapeutic Corporation.
'4 YOMIUIU SHIMBUN, Mar. 4, 1996, (Morning and Evening eds.).
" Yakujih6 § 1.
16 Yakujih6 §§ 14(2), 56(6), 69-2, etc.
" It is obvious that, had the information concerning the risk of HIV transmission been given to
hemophiliacs, they would not have used such risky products, even considering their efficacy as a treatment
for hemophilia.
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of unheated blood products,8 for which the ministry's regulatory power is a
prerequisite. Further, it was possible to supply hemophiliacs with the
substitutes for unheated blood products that they should have been
provided, by switching to cryo or by importing heated blood products from
the United States immediately. So the injuries were avoidable. It is this
aspect that the "Statements of Opinion" pointed out, and it seems proper as
a legal judgment as well.
Some take the phrase "transcending the dispute over the existence of
legal responsibility," in the section entitled "The Proposal for Resolution
through Settlement," as a basis for arguing that the "Statements of Opinion"
do not presuppose the defendants' legal responsibility. It should be noted,
however, that the courts did not say, "transcending legal responsibility." By
definition, parties can come to a settlement only by abandoning a dispute
between them. So considering the nature of the "Statements of Opinion,"
which recommended that the parties settle, it was instead natural that the
courts used the phrase "transcending the dispute over the existence of legal
responsiblity."
B. The Courts' Second Proposals for Settlement and "Statements of
Opinion'
(1) On March 7, 1996, the Tokyo and Osaka District Courts revealed
their second proposals for settlement along with "Statements of Opinion on
the Second Proposals for Settlement" ("Second Statements of Opinion").
The second proposals dealt with issues other than the lump sum settlement,
namely, supplementary relief not discussed in the first proposals such as
permanent measures, the treatment of those who had not yet filed suit, and
so forth.
In summary, their proposals were as follows:
(a) Beneficiaries of the Settlement.
(i) This settlement shall cover the plaintiffs in the first through
fourth lawsuits.
(ii) After the parties [in the first through fourth lawsuits] settle,
" Yakujih6 § 69-2 (emergency orders).
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the courts will promptly examine the evidence concerning the
fact of HIV infection through the use of unheated blood
products59 as to the plaintiffs in the fifth through eighth
lawsuits, and will expand the scope of the settlement to them.
(iii) For those infected but yet to sue, and for their survivors,
the courts will await the commencement of their actions, then
examine the evidence concerning the fact of HIV infection
through the use of unheated blood products, 60 and will expand
the scope of the settlement to them.
(b) Health Maintenance Allowances.6'
(i) The defendant government shall continue to pay health
maintenance costs as before to those who are infected with HIV
but have not yet developed AIDS symptoms, pursuant to the
"Guidelines for Implementing Research Activities for the
Purpose of Contributing to Prevention of Development of
AIDS in Those Who Became Infected With HIV through Blood
Products," and shall make every effort to amplify such
payment.
(ii) Following the settlement, the defendant government and
the pharmaceutical firms shall make monthly payments of
V150,000 [about $1,200] per person to all those who became
infected with HIV through the use of unheated concentrated
blood products62 and have developed AIDS. The defendant
government's share of such payment shall be forty percent.
The defendant government shall handle this matter within the
framework of the Public Finance Act.63
(c) Attorneys' Fees (omitted).
'9 For victims of secondary infection, the courts will examine the evidence concerning how each
became infected.
0 For victims of secondary and tertiary infection, the courts will examine the evidence concerning
how each became infected.
61 This is a provisional title.
62 The victims of secondary and tertiary infection are also included.
'3 Zaiseih6 [Public Finance Act], Law No. 34 of 1947.
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(d) Apportionment of the Defendant Pharmaceutical Firms'
Share.
[Each of the defendant pharmaceutical firms shall pay] the pro
rata amount calculated on the basis of its share as of 1983 in
the unheated blood products market in Japan.
(e) The Friendship and Welfare Foundation's Relief Project.
(i) The Friendship and Welfare Foundation's relief project for
those infected with HIV shall be continued for the time being
following this settlement; however, [the persons concerned] shall
study terminating the project, with a goal of about the year 2001.
(ii) Following the settlement, the defendant government shall
bear forty percent of the expenses of this relief project.
(iii) Amounts received by a claimant from the Friendship and
Welfare Foundation after this settlement has been reached shall
be subject to offsetting, so the entire amount shall be subtracted
from the amount of the lump sum settlement.
(f) Other Permanent Measures.
The defendant government' shall continue negotiations with
those infected with HIV including the plaintiffs, hear their
opinions, and diligently strive to take appropriate measures
with respect to medical care for HIV victims, and related
issues, such as setting up an HIV research and treatment center,
making the selected key hospitals ready for AIDS patients,
designating more key hospitals, making the national health
insurance fully applicable to hospital charges for all types of
wards,65 reimbursing the medical expenses of the victims of
secondary and tertiary infection, and recognizing individuals
with HIV as physically disabled.
I.e., the Health and Welfare Ministry.
65 [Translator's note: The original text says "sagaku beddo no kaish6," which literally means "to do
away with beds for which extra charges apply."]
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(2) The contents of the "Second Statement of Opinion" issued by the
Osaka District Court with its second proposals for settlement were as
follows:
(i) To start with, the "Second Statement of Opinion" mentioned the
parties' discussions and efforts toward settlement following the
courts' first proposals. It indicated that the court was convinced that,
in light of the pathetic situation of the victims and their families that
the court had had a chance to observe during the negotiation process,
there was no way to resolve this dispute other than through
settlement, which should make early and comprehensive relief
available to all those infected with HIV, regardless of which brand of
product they had used or when they had become infected.
(ii) Next, the court pointed out that the settlement proposals were
intended to relieve the victims within the time constraint of early
relief by settling their claims in the form of damages in tort, and that,
for this reason, there were limitations in terms of encompassing
particular welfare measures in various areas. The court recognized
that it would be impossible to solve all the problems conclusively in
this settlement, especially with regard to the arrangement and
reinforcement of medical care, and hoped that the government would
do its best to improve the situation.
(iii) The court also emphasized that every effort must be made to
eradicate societal discrimination against individuals with HIV.
(iv) Furthermore, the court stated that special consideration and
sympathy were due to plaintiffs who were the survivors [of AIDS
victims], but requested their special understanding of the fact that the
suggested amount of the lump sum settlement was equal for each of
the claimants because the living victims might also have to
unavoidably share the same cruel and tragic fate in the future, and to
provide comprehensive relief for all the victims without delay. The
court hoped that the survivor plaintiffs would understand.
(v) Finally, the "Second Statement of Opinion" requested that the
defendants, as those responsible for aiding the victims and solving
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this problem, reflect seriously on themselves, make a renewed
resolution to ensure the safety of pharmaceutical products, and
unhesitatingly accept the courts' proposals.
(3) The second proposals for settlement presented a plan consisting of
relief not mentioned in the first proposals, such as the so-called permanent
measures, litigation costs, including attorneys' fees, and the treatment of the
victims yet to file suit. Among these, the contents of the permanent
measures would have been difficult to order through adjudication." It was
on this point that advantages of settlement existed, in addition to the
speediness of the recovery. It is true that there were limitations, in that the
proposals did not cover welfare measures, such as reimbursing hospital
charges for all types of wards, setting up an HV research center, and
designating key hospitals, but still, it seems reasonable to say that the
proposals encompassed much more substantive steps toward a complete
solution than a judicial decree could have ordered.
Further, that the courts proposed that the defendants defray litigation
costs including attorneys' fees, together with an abundance of expressions
implying the defendants' legal responsibility, which can be found
throughout the "Second Statements of Opinion," may be yet more evidence
showing that this settlement presupposed the defendants' legal
responsibility.
Yet it is regrettable from the victims' point of view that, as a practical
matter, only those who have already developed AIDS are eligible for the
[monthly] health maintenance allowances, because adequate treatment is
indispensable to retardation of the development of symptoms, and health
maintenance allowances seem to be necessary in order to enable and to
motivate individuals [with HIV] to seek such medical treatment.
IV. THE SETTLEMENT AND ITS OVERALL EVALUATION
(1) On March 29, 1996, the plaintiffs, the defendant government, and
the five defendant pharmaceutical firms reached a settlement. This
settlement was based on the "Statements of Opinion" issued with the courts'
first proposals for settlement and the "Second Statements of Opinion"
issued with their second proposals for settlement.
Courts may not approve periodic payments as damages, for example.
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The terms of the settlement dealt with the lump sum settlement,
attorneys' fees, filing fees and other litigation costs, methods of payment,
health maintenance allowances, and plaintiffs' renunciation of remaining
claims. Basically, the terms were the same as those suggested in the courts'
first and second proposals.
(2) Upon settlement, the parties exchanged memoranda, confirming
that:
(a) The Health and Welfare Minister and the pharmaceutical firms
promised as outlined below:
(i) The Health and Welfare Minister and the pharmaceutical
firms shall sincerely and solemnly accept the courts' first and
second "Statements of Opinion," recognize and reflect on their
grave responsibility concerning HIV transmission, and
apologize to the victims from the bottoms of their hearts for
having caused enormous injuries, both physically and
spiritually.
(ii) The Health and Welfare Minister shall deeply reflect on the
fact that, despite firm promises to do his best [to prevent future
such tragedies] when settling the cases of the victims of the
harmful side effects of thalidomide and chinoform, the
Ministry once again let tragic injuries occur. The Health and
Welfare Minister shall do his best to clarify the truth further,
and shall make a definite promise afresh to exercise the various
powers given to him in order to make every effort to keep such
injuries from happening again.
(iii) The pharmaceutical firms shall sincerely recognize their
duty to supply safe products to consumers, and shall make a
definite promise to make their best and utmost efforts to keep
tragic injuries due to pharmaceutical products, as in the present
case, from ever happening again.
(b) The parties reached agreement concerning the parties to be
compensated, the lump sum settlement, health maintenance costs, [monthly]
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health maintenance allowances for those suffering from AIDS, how the five
pharmaceutical firms would make payment, and the treatment of the
Friendship and Welfare Foundation's relief project. Among other matters
also arranged were the following permanent measures:
(i) The Health and Welfare Minister, while listening to the
opinions of the plaintiffs, shall make efforts to take appropriate
measures concerning the enhancement of medical care for
those infected with HIV.
(ii) The Health and Welfare Ministry shall create a forum for
discussing with those infected with HIV, including the
plaintiffs, medical care and related matters for those with HIV,
such as setting up an HIV research and treatment center,
designating key hospitals and improving the conditions thereof,
reimbursing hospital charges for all types of wards, and
recognizing the victims of secondary and tertiary infection as
physically disabled.
(iii) The pharmaceutical firms, too, shall make efforts to
enhance the quality of medical treatment for those infected
with HIV.
Further, an agreement was also reached, basically following the
courts' proposals, as to the treatment of victims yet to file suit, attorneys'
fees, and filing fees and other litigation costs.
(3) Thus, the HIV litigation came to an initial conclusion. In closing,
I would like to discuss, in part reorganizing what I have already stated, how
we should appraise overall such dispute resolution through settlement.
First, it must be pointed out that, considering the urgent need of
relief, it was, in a sense, out of necessity that this litigation ended in
settlement, because, as the "Statements of Opinion" noted, the number of
the victims of the HIV incident amounted to so many as 1,800 to 2,000, and
it was imperative that immediate relief be given, in light of the sad reality of
the disease that all these victims would develop AIDS, experience various
symptoms, and die. Even if some of the victims had won a lawsuit, their
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suffering would have been multiplied during the defendants' appeals to the
High Courts and then to the Supreme Court; besides, those who had yet to
sue would have had to initiate suit from the beginning. Given such
circumstances, it seems fair to say that a framework for a total resolution
through settlement would have been needed at some stage [in any case], as
evidenced, for example, by our experience in the lawsuits concerning
mercury poisoning in Minamata and subacute myelo-optico-neuropathy
(SMON).67 It was significant for purposes of providing relief to the victims
that this litigation came to a close before formal judgment was rendered,
even though the trials had already been finished. The courts' efforts, in
addition to those of the victims, their attorneys, and their supporters, must
be especially noted.
Secondly, resolution through settlement was necessary also in terms
of the contents of relief suitable for the injuries in question. As is widely
known, under current [Japanese] tort law, damages compensation is to be
made by means of one-time payment, and although some scholars suggest
that periodic payments ought also be allowed, the courts have yet to endorse
them. Moreover, in this particular case, not only cash payment such as
health maintenance allowances, but also many nonpecuniary permanent
measures were called for, such as setting up an HIV research and treatment
center, enhancing the quality of key hospitals, reimbursing hospital charges
for all types of wards, defraying medical costs of victims of secondary and
tertiary infection, and recognizing those with HIV as physically disabled.
These are steps that cannot be ordered by court decision under the present
legal system, which may have been another reason that settlement was
found necessary. Yet, although the settlement did stipulate monthly health
maintenance allowances, even though insufficient, all the other measures
were left to future talks. It is true that creation of a forum itself can be seen
as a fruitful result of the settlement, but this is still [just] a starting point. It
is essential that henceforth the permanent measures for remedying the
victims' situation be implemented one after another.
Thirdly, judging from the above, this settlement, looked at as a whole,
can be characterized as one that aimed at a "supralegal" resolution:6" it
67 See AwAni TAKEHISA, SMON JIKEN TO HO [THE SMON INCIDENT AND THE LAW] (1981). [Note 4
in the original article.]
I presented a conceptual framework for disputes over pollution in Awaji Takehisa, K6gaifuns6 no
kaiketsu hdshiki tojittai, in 4 CHOSHAKU KOGAIHO TAIKEI [I] (1973). In the book cited supra note [67], 1
used this framework as a perspective for analyzing various issues, and actually examined the SMON
incident. Also, I discussed the categories of recent mass toxic tort litigation that have ended in settlement,
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sought, based on the [defendants'] legal responsibility indicated in the
courts' "Statements of Opinion," relief that could not have or could only
with difficulty have been obtained under current law. Whether it will have
much substance or not, however, is up to the parties' efforts6 9 and the
support of public opinion in the future. In this respect, the settlement was
but the first step to a [complete] solution.
V. CONCLUSION
Although there are some reservations as mentioned above, the dispute
has been solved by [the defendants' promises to pay] compensation for the
victims' losses and [to provide] other relief measures. Yet there is no
genuine solution unless we make sure that tragic injuries due to
pharmaceutical products, as occurred in this incident, will not be repeated.
In the "written vow" that the government and the pharmaceutical firms
submitted when they assented to the settlement proposals, they promised
never to let such injuries happen again. But words alone are not enough.
What is wrong with the current law and the legal system must be examined
hereafter,7" but prior to that, [all] the facts of the HIV incident must be
elucidated and the responsibility for this incident must be clarified. I hope
that the facts will be brought to light in the Diet, in the media, and in court,
when necessary.7
in Awaji Takehisa, Kdgai, kanky6funs6, 48 HOSHAKAIGAKU 93 (1996), focusing on advantages of such
settlements. [Note 5 in the original article.]
" Particularly, governmental policy concerning how to improve the current system and how to
construct a new system in order to accomplish the various relief measures is of fundamental importance.
70 I understand that JuRIstrro plans to publish more articles on this theme.
' [Translator's note: See supra note 9.]
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